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DEVELOPMENT LENDING AND THE 

COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT* 

KEITH N. H YLTONt 
INTRODUCTION 
I grew up in a city and believe that the economic health of 
cities can be taken as a sign or predictor of the health of a nation's 
economy. Many cities in the United States have fared poorly in 
recent history, losing businesses and wealthy residents to the sub­
urbs. I noticed a familiar pattern as I read a description of the de­
cline of the Roman Empire in Britain: 
This Roman town life did not last. The damage to the well­
to-do classes through high taxation; the ruin of trade through de­
preciation of the coinage and lack of free, productive industry; 
the multiplication of officials; civil war, and the plunder of cities 
by rival armies; these were some-though not all-of the reasons 
why from the middle of the third century the towns began to lose 
their amenities. In Britain, for example, the forum of Wroxeter 
was destroyed by fire about the year 300; it was never rebuilt. At 
Silchester there is evidence that towards the later period of the 
life of the town a less civilized class came into possession of the 
fine houses and did their cooking on the tessellated pavements. 
At Verulamium the theatre became a stone quarry. 
The decay of town life did not mean at once the end of Ro­
man culture. The economic basis of the Empire was agricultural, 
and the Roman villa, like the Roman army and bureaucracy, sur­
vived long after the Roman town had become a squalid slum.1 
If we take out the reference to civil war, most of the points in 
E.L. Woodward's quick list of reasons for decline apply to the expe­
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Development symposium held at the Western New England College School of Law on 
March 24, 2006, and provide a brief overview of the law-and-economics literature on 
urban economic development. Professor Hylton participated in a panel entitled "The 
Future of the Community Reinvestment Act." 
t Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University; 
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1. E.L. WOODWARD, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM ROMAN TIMES TO THE END 
OF WORLD WAR I, at 4-5 (Harper & Row 1962). 
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rience of many American cities in the 1960s and 1970s. Even the 
reference to rival armies has some validity: drug prohibition has 
spawned rival private militias that battle over market territory 
within cities. 
While the news has improved in many cities over the last two 
decades? there are also many cases where the turnaround has yet 
to occur. The full story of the Roman Empire should give us suffi­
cient motivation to find ways to improve the economic health of 
American cities. 
One approach is finance. There is now a growing body of em­
pirical literature that demonstrates the connection between eco­
nomic growth and the strength of financial markets.3 If this 
connection is true of cities as well, the obvious implication is that 
the economic turnaround of cities can be enhanced by expanding 
financial markets to distressed communities within cities. In any 
event, belief in this proposition led me to study this topic years ago. 
In a series of articles on community-development lending pub­
lished in the late 1990s, I criticized the Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA).4 Criticizing the CRA, however, was not the sole focus 
of these articles. I offered a theoretical framework for analyzing 
the statute that I hoped would be useful to scholars who attempted 
either to justify or to condemn the statute. I also offered alterna­
tives to the current approach, pointing especially toward the subsi­
dization of economic-development efforts. 
Looking back, it appears that I underestimated the degree to 
which the political controversy surrounding the CRA would color 
the treatment some later scholars would give to my work. I have 
been disappointed to find later writers describing me as a "critic" of 
the statute,5 along with other "critics" such as Charles Calomiris,6 
2. America's Cities: They Can Yet Be Resurrected, ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 1998, at 
17. 
3. See, e.g., Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (Nat'l Bu­
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10766, 2004), available at http://www.nber 
.org/papers/wl0766. 
4. Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic 
Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237 
(1996) [hereinafter Hylton & Rougeau, Lending Discrimination j; Keith N. Hylton & 
Vincent D. Rougeau, The Community Reinvestment Act: Questionable Premises and 
Perverse Incentives, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 163 (1999) [hereinafter Hylton & 
Rougeau, Perverse Incentives j; Keith N. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities: Market and 
Regulatory Obstacles to Development Lending, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 197 (2000) [herein­
after Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities J. 
5. DAN IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 
AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 278 n.l (2004); Michael Barr, 
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Michael Klausner,? Jonathan Macey,S Geoffrey Miller,9 George 
Benston,lO Peter Swire,l1 and Lawrence White.12 Not that I mind 
the company; the list of eRA co-critics makes an extremely impres­
sive team of scholars in law and economics. What troubles me 
about the critic label is that I, as well as many of the others listed as 
critics, have tried to set out theoretical and empirical hypotheses 
that would be equally useful to proponents and critics of the statute. 
In other words, it was my aim to set out a road map for analyzing 
community-development finance efforts as well as to criticize the 
shortcomings of the existing approach. Moreover, the label "critic" 
masks the variety of views expressed by scholars who have criti­
cized the statute. Indeed, many of the so-called critics have criti­
cized other critics in addition to criticizing aspects of the eRA. To 
label them all as one monolithic mass obscures the record of schol­
arship in this field and fails to respect the sometimes-divergent indi­
vidual messages offered by each. 
I will make three arguments below. First, I will briefly review 
the key points of my earlier papers. Second, I will respond to a few 
of the assertions made by "the critics of the critics." Lastly, I will 
discuss the way forward: specifically, principles for urban develop­
ment and legislative reform. 
I. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT LENDING: 

A BRIEF REVIEW 

The three articles I wrote on the eRA, two of them 
coauthored with Vincent Rougeau, provide different ways of think-
Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 513,518-19 (2005). 
6. Barr, supra note 5, at 518 n.21 (citing Charles W. Calomiris et aI., Housing­
Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor, 26 J. 
MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 634 (1994)). 
7. Id. (citing Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A 
Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
1561 (1995)). 
8. Id. (citing Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvest­
ment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993)). 
9. Id. (citing Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvest­
ment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993)). 
10. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 5, at 278 (citing George Benston, Discrimination in 
Mortgage Lending: Why HMDA and CRA Should Be Repealed, 19 J. RETAIL BANKING 
SERVICES 47 (1997)). 
11. Barr, supra note 5, at 518 n.21 (citing Peter P. Swire, Equality o/Opportunity 
and Investment in Creditworthiness, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1533 (1995)). 
12. Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions 
Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1993). 
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ing about the problem of financing community development. The 
first, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evi­
dence, and the Community Reinvestment Act (Lending Discrimina­
tion), examines the theory and evidence on lending discrimination 
and its implications for the CRA.13 In this article, I viewed discrim­
ination as the core market failure to consider, and in this sense 
parted company with the first legal and economic critique of the 
CRA, that of Macey and Miller.14 
I disagreed with Macey and Miller on the market failure ques­
tion. I5 Macey and Miller were clearly aware of the market failure 
problem, but they argued as if lending markets were efficient, and 
consequently, there was no need for government intervention to 
correct a shortfall in lending in economically distressed communi­
ties. I6 My reason for disagreeing was largely personal. It seemed to 
me obvious that the unemployment and economic decay observed 
in several American inner cities could not be the result of an effi­
cient market. 
However, I did not disagree with all of the points made by Ma­
cey and Miller-and indeed, I would question my own work if I 
found that I disagreed with everything they said. Their points 
about the burdens imposed and investment disincentives created by 
the statute seemed largely unassailable and in accord with the evi­
dence. Moreover, the policy question they framed remains the 
question of the moment: Are the social benefits provided by the 
statute greater than the social costs? 
In the same paper, I discussed empirical issues and provided a 
preliminary empirical examination of the lending discrimination hy­
pothesis based on lending data provided to the city of Chicago by 
banks that served as municipal depositoriesP I stressed the impor­
tance of attempting to control for selection effects in any effort to 
test for discrimination in lending data. IS For example, if minority 
13. Hylton & Rougeau, Lending Discrimination, supra note 4. 
14. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment 
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291 (1993). 
15. Hylton & Rougeau, Lending Discrimination, supra note 4, at 238 n.13, 262. 
16. Macey 8< Miller, supra note 14. 
17. Hylton & Rougeau, Lending Discrimination, supra note 4, at 253-62, 277. 
18. Id. at 255, 268-77; see Robert P. Trost et aI., Bias in Estimates of Discrimina­
tion and Default in Mortgage Lending: The Effects of Simultaneity and Self-Selection, 9 
J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 197 (1994); Faye Steiner, Quantifying Discrimination in 
Home Mortgage Lending: Estimation of Loan Price Elasticities Across Products and 
Races (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol'y Research, Discussion Paper No. 00-15, 2000), 
available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=262733. 
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mortgage applicants prefer to live in areas where mortgage-default 
risks are higher, this might lead to higher observed rejection rates 
even in the absence of discriminatory preferences on the part of 
lenders. 
The discrimination hypothesis led me into an exploration of 
the economic theory of discrimination and its application to the 
lending market. Following the economic literature, I distinguished 
between taste-based and statistical discrimination.19 The former 
type of discrimination is based on a supposed "taste for discrimina­
tion" possessed by the economically advantaged party (e.g., the em­
ployer, the lender, etc.).20 The second type of discrimination, 
statistical, is based on the efforts of the advantaged party to use 
some superficial characteristic, such as the race of the applicant or 
the racial composition of the applicant's neighborhood, to deter­
mine the profitability of an action that affects the applicant (e.g., 
denial of job, denial of loan, etc.).21 
To my surprise, I found that the statistical discrimination the­
ory had not previously been applied in a detailed manner to the 
lending discrimination problem, and that the theory was in this re­
spect underdeveloped. A large part of my argument in Lending 
Discrimination is an effort to flesh out the implications of the statis­
tical discrimination theory.22 The theory's implications depend 
greatly on the accuracy of race (or whatever statistic the economi­
cally advantaged party uses) as a predictor and on the cost of gath­
ering information. 
The second article, The Community Reinvestment Act: Ques­
tionable Premises and Perverse Incentives (Perverse Incentives), is 
an exploration of the costs generated by the statute.23 I did not put 
serious effort into reexamining the social-benefit question, as I had 
already done so in Lending Discrimination. I thought it was worth­
while to examine the costs question because previous treatments 
had focused largely on the paperwork and other direct compliance 
costs imposed on banks. 
The costs of the eRA, in addition to compliance costs, include 
undesirable incentive effects created by the statute. Some undesir­
able incentive effects are well known and have been discussed in 
19. Hylton & Rougeau, Lending Discrimination, supra note 4, at 247-50. 
20. Id. at 250. 
21. Id. at 247-50. 
22. Id. at 247-50, 253-62. 
23. Id. at 250. 
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the previous literature.24 For example, the fact that the statute's 
burdens would discourage banks from entering markets in which 
compliance could be costly has been noted in previous articles.25 
Because of this incentive, lenders that already serve distressed in­
ner-city communities will face less competition, and will therefore 
be able to charge higher rates to their customers, creating evidence 
of the underinvestment and price discrimination that the statute 
aims to reverse. 
Perverse Incentives identifies a few more costs. One is "inade­
quate incentives"; that is, the failure to offer incentives to a large 
set of banks and lenders.26 Of course, this is a cost only to the ex­
tent that it represents a welfare loss relative to a regime in which 
the statute provides optimal incentives. Specifically, banks that did 
not have expansion plans probably had little incentive to invest ef­
fort in compliance. There is empirical evidence that banks that in­
tend to expand try harder to comply with the statute.27 The 
converse would seem to be implied by the same evidence: banks 
that are not intending to expand have weak incentives to invest in 
eRA compliance. 
Another cost is the incentive to adopt "socially undesirable 
compliance stratagems": compliance in a manner that meets regula­
tory tests but imposes substantial external costs.2s For example, 
suppose a bank participates with or finances the work of a preda­
tory lender, in part to satisfy investment requirements of the stat­
ute. Although there is no solid empirical evidence of this, there is 
some evidence29 and a disturbingly clear incentive for predatory 
lenders to take advantage of the incentives created by the statute. 
Another category of costs falls under the heading of "rent 
seeking costs. "30 Mergers create rents or destroy rents. For exam­
ple, take the case of a merger that will enhance competition in a 
24. See Macey & Miller, supra note 14, at 295-96. 
25. Hylton & Rougeau, Perverse Incentives, supra note 4, at 187 n.l00 (citing Ma­
cey & Miller, supra note 14, at 340; White, supra note 12, at 287). 
26. Id. at 183-87. 
27. Raphael Bostic et aI., Regulatory Incentives and Consolidation: The Case of 
Commercial Bank Mergers and the Community Reinvestment Act,S, no.1 ADVANCES IN 
ECON. ANALYSIS & PoL'Y, art. 2 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.comlbejeap/ 
advances/vol5/issllart2. 
28. Hylton & Rougeau, Perverse Incentives, supra note 4, at 184-86. 
29. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory 
Lending, 29 FORDHAM DRB. L.l. 1571 (2002); see also Hylton & Rougeau, Perverse 
Incentives, supra note 4, at 185-86 (discussing the allegedly predatory lending actions of 
Fleet Financial Bank of Boston, Massachusetts). 
30. Hylton & Rougeau, Perverse Incentives, supra note 4, at 187-89. 
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local banking market. Such a merger would destroy oligopolistic 
rents, profits that exist because of the weakness of local competi­
tion, earned by incumbent banks. The larger those oligopolistic 
rents, the more the incumbent market competitors have an incen­
tive to seek to block the proposed merger. The CRA provides a 
process by which local competitors can delay or potentially block 
the merger. Since the oligopolistic rents could be substantial, the 
local competitors may be willing to invest considerable sums in the 
regulatory process. 
"Transaction costs" are another set of costs created by the stat­
ute.31 The statute increases the cost of any merger among regulated 
entities. A merger is a financial transaction, a contract between two 
firms. The costs of regulatory compliance become part of the trans­
action costs of carrying out a merger.32 Moreover, the transaction 
costs imposed on the acquiring party create a differential between 
the merger price agreed between the merging parties and the total 
price paid by the acquiring firm.33 Since the amounts invested into 
the CRA approval process will be forfeited if the merger is not ac­
complished, the additional transaction costs provide incentives to 
merger targets and third parties to ramp up their demands during 
the course of the merger process.34 
There may be other costs that I have not considered, but my 
point is straightforward: once we have identified a list of substantial 
costs created by the statute, the question whether the incremental 
benefits of the statute exceed its incremental costs becomes some­
what clearer. An empirical effort to determine whether the statute 
is worthwhile requires, in order to be rigorous, more than an exami­
nation of statistics on mortgage lending. A rigorous effort to deter­
mine whether the statute is socially desirable as currently enforced 
would compare the sum of the estimated incremental benefits with 
the sum of the estimated incremental costs. 
My third article, Banks and Inner Cities: Market and Regula­
tory Obstacles to Development Lending (Banks and Inner Cities), 
reflects an effort to return to the market failure question explored 
earlier in Lending Discrimination.35 Rather than treating discrimi­
nation as the essential market failure, I focused on asymmetric in­
31. Id. at 189-90. 
32. Id. 
33. See id. at 190. 
34. Id. 
35. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities, supra note 4. 
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formation, which struck me as a more plausible account of market 
failure.36 
The reasons for focusing on asymmetric information are de­
tailed in the article, but the core reason is that the discrimination 
hypothesis finds little support in the data today, and yet the prob­
lem of underinvestment remainsY The most likely account for 
market failure is the "asymmetric-information/credit rationing" hy­
pothesis explored in the economic-development literature.38 I ap­
plied that hypothesis to the market for urban development 
lending.39 Much of the analysis in Banks and Inner Cities is an ef­
fort to elaborate on the credit rationing theory in the context of 
urban lending markets. 
I concluded that the eRA, in conjunction with other banking 
regulations (especially safety and soundness), should be viewed as 
an obstacle to development finance. 4o The core reason is a funda­
mental mismatch in compliance costs. The statutory framework is 
designed in a way that imposes the greatest compliance costs on 
"small, community development-oriented bank[s]'''41 Large banks 
find the compliance costs relatively small and have strong incen­
tives to obtain high compliance grades under the statute in order to 
facilitate future expansion plans.42 The mismatch problem is that it 
is primarily within small, community-development-oriented banks 
where we find individuals who have the most information and the 
greatest incentives to finance productive community-development 
efforts.43 Banking-sector regulation serves to obstruct the develop­
36. Id. at 199. 
37. Id. at 206-08, 222-23. 
38. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with 
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 409 (1981). 
39. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities, supra note 4, at 223-29. 
40. Id. at 229-33. 
41. Id. at 234. 
42. Id. at 229-36. 
43. See, e.g., W. Scott Frame et aI., Credit Scoring and the Availability of Small 
Business Lending in Low- and Moderate-Income Areas, 39 FIN. REV. 35, 54 (2004) 
(credit scoring reduces informational asymmetry and expands lending by large banks to 
small businesses); Allen N. Berger et aI., Further Evidence on the Link Between Finance 
and Growth: An International Analysis of Community Banking and Economic Perform­
ance (FEDS, Working Paper No. 2003-47,2003; Bank of Finland, Discussion Paper No. 
8, 2004; World Bank Pol'y Research, Working Paper No. 3105, 2004), available at http:// 
ssrn.comlabstract=427780; Allen N. Berger et aI., The Ability ofBanks to Lend to Infor­
mationally Opaque Small Businesses (World Bank Pol'y Research, Working Paper No. 
2656,2001), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=260575 (suggesting that small relation­
ship-banks have an advantage in lending to opaque small businesses); James A. 
Brickley et aI., Boundaries of the Firm: Evidence from the Banking Industry (Simon 
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ment and expansion of community-development-oriented 
institutions.44 
Banks and Inner Cities suggests that empirical work on the 
quantity of loans may be inadequate to answer the question 
whether the CRA's benefits exceed its costS.45 Whenever one ex­
amines a regulatory regime, there is always the question of dead­
weight loss, which is the difference between the outcome under the 
statute and what would be observed in the optimal feasible regula­
tory regime. In an optimally regulated regime, the fundamental 
mismatch observed under the current system would not be ob­
served. The likely consequence is that community-development­
oriented banks would expand relative to their competitors, and 
would support a strong entrepreneurial foundation for growth 
within cities. 
II. A BRIEF RESPONSE TO CRITICS 
As I have suggested already, there is now a school of "critics of 
critics" who appear to assert that the CRA is essentially without 
flaws. 46 Their work focuses almost entirely on recent empirical 
studies of lending and does not provide a new or alternative theo­
retical approach to that offered in the first wave of law-and-eco­
nomics analyses that were critical of the statute.47 Indeed, it 
Sch. of Bus., Bradley Pol'y Research Ctr., Fin. Research Pol'y Working Paper No. FR 
00-01, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=204728 (supporting a hypothesis that 
small local banks have advantages over large banks); David A. Carter et a\., Do Small 
Banks Have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of Small Business Lending 
Performance for Large and Small Banks (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
297007 (presenting evidence that small banks have an advantage in small business lend­
ing); George R.G. Clarke et a\., Does Foreign Bank Penetration Reduce Access to Credit 
in Developing Countries? Evidence from Asking Borrowers (World Bank Pol'y Re­
search, Working Paper No. 2716, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=285767 (in­
dicating that although foreign bank penetration increases competition, benefits go 
primarily to large firms; suggesting small firms are still best served by local lenders); 
Ben R. Craig & James B. Thomson, Federal Home Loan Bank Lending To Community 
Banks: Are Targeted Subsidies Necessary? (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Working Pa­
per No. 01-12, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=282410 (suggesting that infor­
mation, rather than funding, is important factor). For a recent discussion of related 
issues in law-and-development context, see generally Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in 
a Distant Mirror: Why The West Has Misperceived the Grameen Bank's Vision of 
Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 217 (2005). 
44. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities, supra note 4, at 235. 
45. Id. at 234-4l. 
46. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 5; Barr, supra note 5. 
47. See, e.g., ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 
AFrER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A FINAL REPORT (U.S. Treasury Dep't 2001) 
(providing findings regarding the effect of financial modernization legislation on the 
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appears that the new critics have entirely avoided an effort to grap­
ple with the question posed in the first wave of writing: Are the 
incremental benefits of the CRA greater than its incremental costs? 
Or, one might put the question at a simpler level: What are the 
incremental benefits of the CRA and what are its incremental 
costs? The empirical literature has not attempted to answer these 
questions. 
This is not the place to go into a detailed discussion of empiri­
cal results. I examined the results in some detail in Lending Dis­
crimination, with a focus on yielding general hypotheses to be 
tested by future analysts.48 The new critics have not, from what I 
can tell, attempted to frame a new or improved set of hypotheses 
for themselves or for future analysts. They have limited themselves 
to reporting the results of empirical research that appears to agree 
with their conclusions (and sometimes disputing the research that 
disagrees) . 
The new researchers have not addressed the mismatch issue 
raised in Banks and Inner Cities.49 There is a fundamental set of 
questions about the philosophy of development and about its prac­
tice and effect. Should we be satisfied with a regime in which, when 
working at its best, large banks cross-subsidize lending in distressed 
communities to an extent that the total amount of lending increases 
relative to what would be observed in the absence of their cross­
subsidization efforts; or should we prefer a regime in which entre­
eRA); Robert B. Avery et aI., CRA Special Lending Programs, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 
711, 731 (2000) (finding that three-quarters of surveyed institutions cited the eRA as a 
contributing factor to their mortgage and small·business lending programs); Raphael 
Bostic with Breck Robinson, Do CRA Agreements Increase Lending Patterns?, 31 REAL 
EST. EeoN. 23, 43-44 (2003) (demonstrating that eRA agreements influenced lending 
decisions even after the end of agreements); Bostic et aI., supra note 27 (showing that 
banks with expansion plans expanded their lending relative to other institutions); 
Raphael W. Bostic & Brian J. Surette, Have the Doors Opened Wider? Trends in Home­
ownership by Race and Income (FEDS, Working Paper No. 00-31, 2000), available at 
http://ssrn.com!abstract=235864 (suggesting that regulatory statutes and economic fac­
tors have led to an increase in home ownership among lower-income families). These 
excellent empirical studies, often cited to support the claim that the eRA has improved 
lending in distressed communities, raise three questions. First, to what extent are ob­
served lending increases due to the CRA or other factors? Second, are the incremental 
benefits of CRA-induced lending greater than the costs? Third, does the statute dis­
courage other approaches that might be more productive? For an empirical article 
reaching negative conclusions on the effects of the eRA, see Jeffery W. Gunther et aI., 
Redlining or Red Herring?, Sw. EeoN., May/June 1999, at 8, available at http://www 
.dallasfed.orglresearch/swe/1999/swe9903.pdf. 
48. Hylton & Rougeau, Lending Discrimination, supra note 4, at 268-79. 
49. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. 
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preneurs in distressed communities find ready access to lenders 
who can help them form productive, job-creating areas of enter­
prise within these communities? 
The existing regulatory regime, though it is coming under pres­
sure to change from the current administration,50 smacks of a top­
down development plan in which large financial institutions make 
the fundamental decisions on the allocation of credit while respond­
ing to pleas and demands for help from various sectors. Within eco­
nomically distressed communities, the parties that can raise the 
clearest threat of blocking future expansion plans are the ones most 
likely to catch the attention of the banks. This plan allows some of 
the lending that finds its way into distressed communities to be di­
verted from economically productive endeavors towards politically 
influential interest groupS.51 
The alternative vision would stress entrepreneurship as the 
base for community development and attempt to build around that 
notion.52 It would minimize the discretionary power of government 
officials and the influence of pressure groups in the allocation of 
credit. 
III. GOING FORWARD: PRINCIPLES FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Based on my earlier work, and from what I have seen of the 
new wave of writing, I think there are three key planks that should 
form part of a community-development finance program, or any 
legislation for that purpose. The three planks are: the enhancement 
of public goods, the subsidization of development efforts, and the 
reduction of regulatory obstacles. 
50. See STRENGTHENING AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, RE­
PORT OF THE STRENGTHENING AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
(2005), available at http://www.eda.govIPDF/EDAmericaSummer05.pdf (stressing en­
trepreneurship model as alternative to existing community development programs 
sponsored by the federal government). 
51. On the harmful effects of politically directed credit allocation, see, e.g., 
Eduardo Levy-Yeyati et aI., State-Owned Banks: Do They Promote or Depress Finan­
cial Development and Economic Growth? (2004) (unpublished paper, available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=629384); Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Unnatural Selection: Per­
verse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re­
search, Working Paper No. 9643, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9643. 
52. J. David Brown et aI., What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Cap­
ital, Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania (Inst. for the Study 
of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 1343,2004; Upjohn Inst. Staff, Working Paper 
No. 03-94, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=425421 (concluding that access to 
finance matters most in growth of small firms). 
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A. Enhancement of Public Goods 
The most basic public good that a government can provide is 
security. And yet security is clearly inadequate in many of the dis­
tressed cities. The causes are numerous: the lack of family cohe­
sion, the failure of the education system, and the perverse effects of 
drug prohibition are some of the most important. 
Security is such an important public good that I doubt that it 
makes sense to talk about community-development finance in its 
absence. Families and businesses will not move into areas in which 
crime is a high and constant risk. Deserted streets invite criminals 
to take them over. It is highly unlikely that any bank could, 
through lending efforts, reverse the small-scale economic depres­
sions created by the lack of security in many cities. 
On the other hand, if you take care of security, you will find 
that businesses and city residents will often be willing to take care 
of the rest of the development project on their own. Some families 
are willing to move into areas with weak schools as long as the 
streets are safe; they can form private schools if necessary. Some 
businesses are willing to move into areas with undereducated labor 
forces as long as their businesses are safe; they can train their em­
ployees or hire workers from elsewhere if necessary. And when 
families and businesses are bidding to move into an area of a city, 
lending institutions will soon follow them. 
Admittedly, security is expensive, but the alternative, absence 
of security, is more expensive. The most important community de­
velopment project that can be undertaken is the provision of secur­
ity to homes and businesses. It follows that a revenue-strapped 
municipal government should seek to pare all of its costs except for 
security. Until security reaches a stage within cities such that it is 
adequate for businesses and families to operate without substan­
tially more risk than experienced in suburban communities, local 
tax revenues should be devoted primarily to security. 
Obviously, education is also a priority. However, education 
can often be funded privately because each recipient of education 
obtains a valuable benefit. That is why people pay for private 
schools. Security, on the other hand, is a benefit that is so broadly 
shared that few people are willing to pay substantial amounts for it 
(beyond purchasing an alarm system), especially when there is the 
option of moving to a secure location. Because the benefits of se­
curity are so broadly dispersed and cannot be captured by any indi­
vidual, it is perhaps the most basic of public goods. 
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Housing values are largely influenced by public goods such as 
security and education. This is obvious if you simply compare the 
values of comparable houses in Detroit and in Boston. Detroit is a 
city that has a high crime rate and a poor education system. Boston 
has, in comparison, a relatively low crime rate-even in its worst 
areas, crime is still mild in comparison to Detroit-and a decent 
educational system. If you take a house from Detroit and move it 
to Boston, you would probably triple its value. 
B. Subsidization of Development Efforts 
In addition to focusing on security as the foundation of any 
community-development plan, statutory regimes to enhance com­
munity-development finance should focus on subsidization rather 
than punishing firms under a one-size-fits-all regulatory structure. 
This is true for several reasons. 
First, as I stressed in Lending Discrimination, you can achieve 
the same incentives with a carrot as you can with a stick.53 Incen­
tives to do any act depend on the payoff for doing the act relative to 
the payoff for not doing it. You increase the incentive to do an act 
by widening the spread between these two payoffs. A penalty 
widens this gap by imposing a cost for not doing the act. A subsidy 
widens the gap by providing a reward for doing the act. 
Sometimes a subsidy is preferable to a penalty. In general, 
when we want to see the provision of a public good, or a benefit to 
society, we should subsidize the act. This is the basic distinction 
found by John Stuart Mill between acts that harm others and acts 
that provide a benefit to society. Mill argued that punishment 
should be restricted to the first set of acts.54 It follows from this 
view that if we want to see people pick up trash on the streets, we 
should subsidize it. The alternative is to punish them for failing to 
pick up trash, but it should be clear that this would have undesir­
able incentive effects. 
The subsidy provides a positive incentive and does not tax peo­
ple for merely falling under the scope of the regulation. When we 
are considering a productive industry such as lending, we should be 
reluctant to pass laws that tax the general activity of lending, unless 
there is evidence that it is in fact socially harmful. Given this, laws 
that seek to target lending in a direction not already induced by the 
53. Hylton & Rougeau, Lending Discrimination, supra note 4, at 282-86 (describ­
ing a shift from a penalty approach to a subsidization approach). 
54. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 92-94 (Oxford Univ. Press 1960) (1859). 
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market should attempt to do so through "bribing" rather than 
punishment. 
In general, one can distinguish between substitution and scale 
effects in regulation. Regulatory penalties induce a substitution to­
ward a desirable act to the extent that they make that desirable act 
less costly than others. However, regulatory penalties can reduce 
the level of desirable acts through scale effects, which discourage 
parties from coming within the scope of the regulation in the first 
place. 
These broad suggestions obviously apply to the eRA. As I 
suggested in Perverse Incentives, the statute and its enforcement 
should be redirected toward positive rewards. Banks that engage 
substantially in the community-development process should be re­
warded with lighter regulatory burdens or tax benefits. This avoids 
the often-observed conflict between substitution and scale effects in 
regulation. 
Indeed, there is a startlingly simple and potentially effective 
subsidization policy that presumably would not require modifica­
tion of federal law: Individual cities can enhance economic-devel­
opment efforts by using the development-lending records of banks 
as a basis for determining the amounts held by each as a municipal 
depository. American cities put enormous sums in accounts held by 
municipal depositories. If city mayors were to shift those accounts 
toward small, development-oriented banks, it would provide a pow­
erful spur for banks to expand finance in economically distressed 
communities. Alternatively, one could envision a system in which 
an independent body graded banks according to their economic­
development efforts within cities and private corporations volunta­
rily directed accounts to banks on the basis of their success in these 
efforts. 
C. Reduction of Regulatory Obstacles 
The third general plank in a sound community-development fi­
nance program is the reduction of regulatory obstacles. Around the 
world, there are many existing regulatory obstacles to development 
lending. Legal systems sometimes inhibit finance by making it diffi­
cult to enforce contracts or to use property as security for loans. 55 
Some prohibit interest charges above a ceiling rate and, in Islamic 
55. A Survey of Microfinance: The Hidden Wealth of the Poor, ECONOMIST, Nov. 
5, 2005, at 3-4. 
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countries, even the charging of interest at al1.56 Some governments 
control banks and direct their lending. 57 Poor monetary policy 
leads to inflation, which reduces the scope of financial markets.58 
Observing some of the stricter forms of regulation in other 
countries, we may be inclined to view our own system as free of 
regulatory obstacles. But regulatory obstacles can take many 
forms. Regulatory laws often benefit one set of firms and disadvan­
tage another set. When this occurs, the firms that benefit gain an 
incentive to support the law, which may have an anticompetitive 
consequence. If the losing firms are the ones that are most likely to 
engage in development lending, then the law, whatever its purpose, 
can be said to serve as a regulatory impediment to development 
lending. 
We should have an eye out for laws that serve as obstacles to 
development finance. In many cases, this will mean taking a skepti­
cal view of many banking regulations because the dominant faction 
within the larger interest group of banks are the big banks that do 
not view development lending as core to their mission. The statute­
making process will not, as a general rule, favor or protect the busi­
ness of development-oriented lenders. 
56. /d. at 3. 
57. Id. at 4. 
58. Id. 
